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Abstract Digital traces found on local hard drives as a result of online activities
have become very valuable in reconstructing events in digital forensic
investigations. This paper demonstrates that forged alibis can be cre-
ated for online activities and social interactions. In particular, a novel,
automated framework is presented that uses social interactions to create
false digital alibis. The framework simulates user activity and supports
communications via email as well as instant messaging using a chat-
bot. The framework is evaluated by extracting forensic artifacts and
comparing them with the results obtained from a human user study.
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1. Introduction
Digital forensic techniques are increasingly applied in criminal inves-
tigations due to the widespread involvement of computers, smartphones
and other modern technologies in crimes. Traces such as MAC times-
tamps and operating system speciﬁc log ﬁles left on hard drives and
information transmitted over network connections are often combined
to produce a holistic reconstruction of events for speciﬁc times of in-
terest [4, 16]. The resulting digital alibis are routinely presented and
examined during investigations and in court proceedings.
This paper describes a framework that fully simulates user interac-
tions and implements the automated creation of digital alibis with spe-
cial focus on online social interactions such as writing email and sending
chat messages. The framework is unique because it engages social in-
teractions that have been ignored in previous work. Additionally, the68 ADVANCES IN DIGITAL FORENSICS X
framework is highly conﬁgurable and is available under an open source
license (github.com/mmulazzani/alibiFramework).
This paper evaluates the framework by comparing it with usage pat-
terns of real world users, demonstrating that digital forensic analysis
methods are not reliable if they are speciﬁcally targeted. The goal is
to raise awareness in the digital forensics community that digital alibis
can be forged and, consequently, it is important to always question the
reliability of digital alibis.
2. Background
Digital alibis have played an important role in numerous cases. In
one case, Rodney Bradford was charged with armed robbery but was
released because digital evidence demonstrated that he was actively us-
ing his Facebook account at the time of the crime [15]. His attorney
noted that the digital evidence gave Bradford an “unbeatable alibi” [2].
In another case, a suspected murderer was acquitted because digital evi-
dence revealed that he was working on his laptop when the murder took
place [7, 17].
A digital forensic analyst is often confronted with multiple hard drives
that have been imaged using hardware write blockers [3], and is asked
speciﬁc questions about user actions that have been or have not been
conducted on the associated computers [5]. Meanwhile, the widespread
use of modern technologies and devices such as social networks [14] and
smartphones [12, 13] dramatically increase the amount of digital traces
that must be considered even in routine cases. The massive quantity
of digital evidence and the accompanying case complexity render auto-
mated analysis crucial to extracting information of interest in a reason-
able amount of time [10, 11].
Several researchers have focused on the creation digital alibis [8, 9].
However, their alibi generators often use proprietary languages such as
AutoIt (Windows) or Applescript (OS X) and are, therefore, speciﬁc to
the underlying operating system (e.g., Windows [8, 9], OS X [7] or An-
droid [1]). Our framework, on the other hand, is not so operating system
speciﬁc because it is implemented in Python. Although the implementa-
tion was developed for Linux systems because no Linux-speciﬁc solutions
existed, it is a simple matter to port it to other platforms. Addition-
ally, the conﬁguration parameters were set based on extensive studies
of real world users, rendering the alibi generation approach statistically
more diﬃcult to detect and the persistently-stored evidence more real-
istic compared with other approaches.Beyer, et al. 69
While other alibi creation approaches attempt to hide their programs
using innocuous ﬁle names or separate storage devices, our framework
is designed to leave no obvious traces. Also, the framework does not
employ a ﬁle wiper during the post processing phase to remove suspi-
cious traces. The rationale is that a forensic analyst should not be able
to determine if the digital evidence artifacts originated from the frame-
work or from a human user. This is accomplished by instrumenting
keyboard signals, mouse clicks and other events within the alibi creation
framework.
3. Alibi Creation Framework
The alibi creation framework is intended to simulate user activity as
realistically and as thoroughly as possible. To this end, it is necessary
to simulate standard user activities such as browsing the web, commu-
nicating via email, chatting with instant messaging software and editing
documents of various types. The concrete actions performed by the
framework should be neither scripted nor predictable; they should be
randomized, but still realistic and convincing to digital forensic investi-
gators.
A variety of word lists and online sources such as Google Trends are
used as inputs to capture a snapshot of current online interests while
simultaneously incorporating speciﬁc user preferences. Many facets of
computer usage are highly user dependent. For the alibi creation frame-
work to be as realistic as possible, factors such as the social interaction
partners for email and chatting, the language of communication and the
time delays between actions and usual concurrent actions must be con-
ﬁgured in advance. Social interactions, in particular, are vulnerable to
traﬃc analysis because the content of the messages as well as the iden-
tities of the communicating parties are of interest. Also, the response
times are dependent on message length, and must be considered carefully
when simulating social interactions.
The proof-of-concept system was implemented on Ubuntu 12.04 LTS
using Python. The core features of the framework were chosen in a
similar manner as other approaches in the literature [7, 8].
The implementation has three main components: (i) scheduler; (ii)
program manager; and (iii) social interaction component. The sched-
uler is responsible for the overall management; it controls startup and
triggers the shutdown of all the involved programs. Also, it decides
which actions to perform (both local and online) and when to perform
them. The program manager runs and manages all applications, includ-
ing the browser and the email and chat software. The social interaction70 ADVANCES IN DIGITAL FORENSICS X
Figure 1. Conceptual view of the alibi creation framework.
component incorporates the email manager and a chatbot for instant
messaging.
Figure 1 shows the main components of the alibi creation framework.
The framework can launch and use local applications by sending key
strokes and mouse clicks. It comes pre-conﬁgured for the use of sev-
eral applications: Firefox, gedit, LibreOﬃce, Thunderbird, Skype and
VLC. The Python libraries xautomation, skype4py and the chatbot im-
plementation PyAIML are used for automation. Furthermore, splinter
(based on Selenium) is used for the automation of Firefox. Thus, the
implementation can browse the web, send and receive email, chat us-
ing Skype, open and edit documents (using LibreOﬃce and gedit)a n d
launch programs such as music players and video players. The frequency
and content of alibi events were derived from the forensic analysis of sev-
eral typical oﬃce workstations at our university.
The framework can query Google and follow suggested links, tweet
on Twitter and log into Facebook. Also, it can search for YouTube
videos and browse websites with random mouse clicks and follow links.
New email messages are drafted, received email messages are forwarded,Beyer, et al. 71
and email responses are sent after reasonable delays. Additionally, it
is possible to mark new email messages as read and to delete email
messages. The action to be performed is chosen at random; not every
email that is read is answered. The subject and content of email can
be predeﬁned and stored in lists. The answering of instant messages
is supported with the help of a chatbot. Reasonable time delays are
implemented based on the response message size and by using random
delays. Chat templates are easily adapted via AIML [18]. When the
timer of the scheduler expires, the chatbot says goodbye and shuts down.
The editing of local documents is implemented by deleting a random
amount of content or by randomly inserting predeﬁned text that ﬁts
the content of the document. The use of LibreOﬃce is implemented by
simulating key strokes and mouse clicks because no Python bindings for
LibreOﬃce are available.
However, one post-processing step is necessary: Splinter has to use a
separate Firefox proﬁle and cannot work directly with the user proﬁle.
Therefore, during startup, splinter copies the user proﬁle to /tmp and
the user proﬁle is overwritten at shutdown by moving it back. Depending
on the user threat model, additional steps might be appropriate.
4. Evaluation
The implementation was evaluated by comparing its behavior with
that of human users. Since the usage of a computer depends heavily
on the person using it, the evaluation of the implementation focused on
demonstrating that the default conﬁguration is reasonable.
Nine human test subjects were asked to use a virtual machine for 30
minutes just like they would use their computers, and the results were
compared with a single run of the framework. The test subjects were
asked to browse the web, send email, chat, edit documents and to do
anything they would normally do.
Sleuth Kit and Autopsy were subsequently applied to the virtual ma-
chine images to extract data in a forensic manner. Timestamps were ex-
tracted and the ﬁles containing user data of interest were inspected man-
ually. Manual analysis was conducted on the browser history places.sqlite
of Firefox, the local mailbox ﬁles of Thunderbird, and the chat history
main.db of Skype to extract timestamps, message content, conversation
partners and the time intervals between messages, email and website vis-
its. Network forensics, namely the inspection of network traﬃc, would
have been an alternative approach for evaluation. However, hard drive
analysis allows unencrypted information as well as additional informa-
tion such as local timestamps to be extracted; this motivated the use of72 ADVANCES IN DIGITAL FORENSICS X
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Browse to Google,
search “java tutorial”
Browse to youtube,
watch popular video
Browse to website
nytimes.com
Start Firefox,
browse to wikipedia
Start VLC,
watch local video
Figure 2. Example timeline of 20 minutes of framework activity.
the evaluation method. Various metrics were used to compare the frame-
work behavior with that of real users during the 30 minute test period:
number of visited websites, durations of website visits and numbers of
chat messages sent and received.
Figure 2 shows an example timeline of 20 minutes of framework ac-
tivity. The social interactions can be observed clearly. A total of twelve
messages were sent by the social interaction component to various recip-
ients, either as responses in ongoing conversations or as new messages to
initiate conversations. The browser was directed to several websites and
links were followed to simulate further browsing (not shown in the ﬁg-
ure). The browsing activities accessed news sites such as nytimes.com
and prominent news stories on the front page; and youtube.com and top
videos from the “most popular” section based on random search queries.
Local timestamps and history logs were written to disk in all cases. Fur-
thermore, VLC was started and a local video from the hard drive was
opened; this is reﬂected in the timestamps shown in Figure 2.
5. Test User Survey
Target websites and time patterns were extracted to capture the
browsing behavior of the nine volunteers; the most popular websites vis-
ited were google.com, facebook.com and various Austrian news sites.
On the other hand, the framework used a preconﬁgured list of websites
and randomized Google queries. Nevertheless, four of the ﬁve most vis-
ited websites by the framework and the users matched. Table 1 shows
three extracted time patterns. The test users did not receive any email
as a result of the experimental setup, but they were asked to send email
messages. On the average, one email message was sent per user. The
maximum number of email messages sent by the users was three and theBeyer, et al. 73
Table 1. Website visit comparison.
Framework Users
Number of Websites 11 Min: 1; Max: 12; Avg: 9
Time on Website (Min) 8 sec 5 sec
Time on Website (Max) 2 min 16 sec 13 min 5 sec
Time on Website (Avg) 1 min 52 sec 2 min 50 sec
minimum was zero. The number of words in an email varied between six
and 51, with an average of 21. The time between sending email varied
between one minute and ﬁfteen minutes.
Table 2. Observed chat behavior (min/max/avg).
Framework Users
Chat Messages Sent 22 (7/46/19)
Chat Messages Received 23 (15/35/21)
Chat Message Length (1/18/8) (1/23/4)
Response Time (sec) (2/175/45) (2/480/64)
Table 2 provides details about the observed chat behavior. Nearly all
the test users conducted chat conversations. There were between seven
and 46 outgoing messages and between ﬁfteen and 35 incoming messages.
The shortest message was one word long for each user. The maximum
number of words in a chat message was 23. The chat message topics
depended strongly on the test users; they included health, football and
movies, as well as small talk. The response time for chat messages was at
least two seconds and at most eight minutes. The average response time
was about one minute and four seconds. The users edited or opened one
document (.ods or .pdf) during the 30 minute timeframe, which was
consistent with the actions of the framework.
6. Discussion
Table 3 compares the behavior of the alibi framework with that of
the test subjects. The browsing behavior of the framework in terms of
the number of websites visited is comparable to that of the test users.
The time spent on each website is on the average shorter than the time
spent by the test users, but this is a parameter that is easily changed
in the framework (just like the number of websites to be visited). Some
test users spent more than ten minutes at a site but, in general, the time
spent by framework on websites generally matches the time spent by the74 ADVANCES IN DIGITAL FORENSICS X
Table 3. Overall comparison framework vs. survey users.
Feature Framework Users
Websites Visited 11 Min: 1 Max: 12
Website Visit Time 1min 52sec Min: 5sec Max: 2min 50sec
Most Visited Websites Matching in 4/5 sites
Email Messages (sent) 1 Min: 0 Max: 3
Email Messages (received) 2 Min: 0 Max: 0
Email Message Length (words) 6 Min: 6 Max: 51
Email Message Content Matching in 1/4 topics
Chat Messages (sent) 22 Min: 7 Max: 46
Chat Messages (received) 23 Min: 15 Max: 35
Chat Message Length (words) Avg: 8 Min: 1 Max: 23
Response Time Avg: 45sec Min: 2sec Max: 1min 4sec
Conversation Content Matching in 2/5 topics
Opened Documents 1 Min: 0 Max: 2
Document Types .ods .ods, .odt, .pdf
test users. Four of the ﬁve most visited websites for the framework and
the test users matched, which is a very good result because the websites
visited by the framework were conﬁgured ap r i o r i . However, the actual
sites visited by the test users depended strongly on user preferences;
this feature will have to be adjusted in the framework. In summary, the
framework adequately simulates web surﬁng activities, but it requires
the implementation of a user-speciﬁc conﬁguration feature.
With regard to chat conversations and the use of the social interac-
tion server, the response time for chat messages matches the expected
response time. The framework adequately models the behavior of test
users in terms of the response time delays and the fact that not every
message is answered.
7. Limitations and Future Work
One limitation of the prototype is the lack of sophisticated contex-
tual analysis of instant messages. While AIML can be used to generate
genuine-looking conversations for short periods of time, a forensic anal-
ysis of the conversations would likely reveal the use of a chatbot. While
this is deﬁnitely a problem in scenarios where the disk is analyzed foren-
sically, the generated alibis would pass network forensic analysis because
most protocols (e.g., Skype) implicitly encrypt messages. This limitation
is more signiﬁcant for unencrypted email conversations. Our future workBeyer, et al. 75
will attempt to identify methods for creating better content-dependent
responses.
Another limitation is adaptivity. To forge a digital alibi in a reli-
able manner, it is necessary to adapt the framework to user preferences.
Currently, most of the framework parameters are conﬁgured manually
and have to be adapted for each user. Ideally, the framework should
be able to adapt the parameters automatically. This can be realized
by collecting user-speciﬁc information from user data or by collecting it
over a longer period during a learning phase. It would also be useful
to compare long-term runs of the framework with real user data – 30
minutes is insuﬃcient to cover all the use cases where digital alibis might
be needed. Another future goal for the framework is supporting other
operating systems and browsers.
An important point to note is that a user who has insuﬃcient knowl-
edge of the tools and the system could leave undesirable evidence. There-
fore, it is essential to continuously update and reﬁne the framework as
operating systems and applications change. The current framework does
not implement any obfuscation methods to hide its execution. Run-
ning the framework from external media as suggested in [6] could help
strengthen the validity of a forged alibi.
8. Conclusions
The proof-of-concept alibi creation framework demonstrates that it
is possible to forge digital alibis that adequately model real user be-
havior. The framework has the ability – if correctly conﬁgured – to
simulate browsing, emailing, chatting and document editing behavior.
The precise simulation that is obtained depends on the conﬁgurations
that should, of course, be adapted to user preferences. This requires
an intimate knowledge of user behavior and usage patterns. Our future
research will focus on adding an automated conﬁguration feature based
on existing log ﬁles or learning user-speciﬁc behavior, with the goal of
rendering the framework behavior more indistinguishable from normal
human behavior, even after analysis by experienced forensic investiga-
tors.
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